Hey all, esteemed members of this Nginx mailing list.
I’m a freelance reporter (former Onion headline writer and former
chemical
engineer) trying to gather some kind of technical consensus on a part of
the Silk Road pretrial that seems to have become mired in needless
ambiguity. Specifically, the prosecution’s explanation for how they were
able to locate the Silk Road’s Icelandic server IP address.
You may have seen Australian hacker Nik Cubrilovic’s long piece
https://www.nikcub.com/posts/analyzing-fbi-explanation-silk-road/ on
how
it, at least, appears that the government has submitted a deeply
implausible scenario for how they came to locate the Silk Road server.
Or Bruce
Scheiener’s comments
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/10/how_did_the_fed.html.
Or
someone else’s. (The court records are hyperlinked in the article, but
they
can be found here
http://www.scribd.com/doc/238796613/Silk-Road-Prosecution-4th-Amendment-Rebuttall
and here
http://ia700603.us.archive.org/21/items/gov.uscourts.nysd.422824/gov.uscourts.nysd.422824.57.0.pdf,
if you’d rather peruse them without Nik’s logic prejudicing your own
opinion. In addition, here
http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/horowitzdec.pdf’s
the opinion of defendant Ross Ulbricht’s lawyer Josh Horowitz, himself a
technical expert in this field, wherein he echoes Nik Cubrilovic’s
critical
interpretation of the state’s discovery disclosures.)
I’m hoping that your collective area of expertise in Nginx might allow
some
of you to comment on this portion of the case, ideally on the record,
for
an article I’m working on.
My goal is to amass many expert opinions on this. It seems like a very
open
and shut case that beat reporters covering it last October gave a little
too much “He said. She said.”-style false equivalency.
I know this is a cold call. PLEASED TO MEET YOU!
Here, below, is the main question, I believe:
This portion of the defense’s expert criticism
http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/horowitzdec.pdf
of the
prosecution’s testimony from former SA Chris Tarbell
http://ia700603.us.archive.org/21/items/gov.uscourts.nysd.422824/gov.uscourts.nysd.422824.57.0.pdf
(at least) appears the most clear cut and definitive:
¶ 7. Without identification by the Government, it was impossible to
pinpoint the 19 lines in the access logs showing the date and time of
law
enforcement access to the .49 server.
-
The “live-ssl” configuration controls access to the market data
contained on the .49 server. This is evident from the configuration
line:
root /var/www/market/public
which tells the Nginx web server that the folder “public” contains the
website content to load when visitors access the site. -
The critical configuration lines from the live-ssl file are:
allow 127.0.0.1;
allow 62.75.246.20;
deny all;
These lines tell the web server to allow access from IP addresses
127.0.0.1
and 65.75.246.20, and to deny all other IP addresses from connecting to
the
web server. IP address 127.0.0.1 is commonly referred to in computer
networking as “localhost” i.e., the machine itself, which would allow
the
server to connect to itself. 65.75.246.20, as discussed ante, is the IP
address for the front-end server, which must be permitted to access the
back-end server. The “deny all” line tells the web server to deny
connections from any IP address for which there is no specific exception
provided. -
Based on this configuration, it would have been impossible for
Special
Agent Tarbell to access the portion of the .49 server containing the
Silk
Road market data, including a portion of the login page, simply by
entering
the IP address of the server in his browser.
Does it seem like the defense is making a reasonably sound argument
here?
Are there any glaring holes in their reasoning to you? Etc.? (I would
gladly rather have an answer to this that is filled with qualifiers and
hedges than no answer at all, and as such, hereby promise that I will
felicitously include all those qualifiers and hedges when quoting.)
Any other observations on this pre-trail debate would also be welcome.
Thanks for your time, very, very, sincerely.
Best Regards,
Matthew
Matthew D. Phelan
“editorial contractor”
Black Bag ▴ Gawker http://blackbag.gawker.com
@CBMDP https://twitter.com/CBMDP // twitter
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email